EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We will employ a modified version of the Dictator Game. In the original dictator game, developed by Forsythe, et al. (1994) , subjects divide m dollars between themselves and another subject so that 7T + 7T = m. In our experiment, each subject is given a menu of choices with different endowments and prices for payoffs, for instance r7 + p 7, = m. These budget sets over payoffs cross in ways that provide a test for whether well-behaved preferences of the form us(7Ts, 7TJ) could explain the data. Specifically, the experiment was conducted with volunteers from intermediate and upper-level economics courses. There were 5 experimental sessions of 34 to 38 subjects each, for a total of 176 subjects. Each subject's task was to allocate "tokens" under a series of different budgets. In sessions 1-4 there were eight budget choices, while session 5 offered 11 budgets. As we discuss later, session 5 was added last to test the strength of the results from sessions 1-4.
Each of the decision problems differed in the number of tokens to be divided and the number of points a token was worth to each subject. Tokens were worth either 1, 2, 3, or 4 points each. The total number of tokens available was either 40, 60, 75, 80, or 100. Subjects made their decision by filling in the blanks in a statement like, "Divide 60 tokens:
Hold _ at 1 point each, and Pass _ at 2 points each." Subjects were encouraged to use a calculator to check their decisions. The decision problems were presented in random order to each subject. Subjects were told that the experimenter would choose one of the decision problems at random and carry it out with another randomly chosen subject as the recipient. Finally, subjects were told that each point earned would be worth $0.10 in payoff, hence 75 points would earn $7.50. The budgets offered are shown in Table I . Notice that each allocation decision presents a convex budget set. Consider budget 1. Here transferring one token raises the other subject's payoff by 1 point, and reduces one's own payoff by 3, implying that the price of the opponent's payoff is 1 and the price of self-payoff is 0.33. Hence, the token endowment is an income variable, the inverse of the hold value is the price of self-payoff 7, and the inverse of the pass value is the price of other payoff nT. When the relative price is 1, as in budgets 7, 8, and 9, the choices are like standard dictator games.
We conducted each session by assembling subjects in a large classroom. We distributed envelopes containing a copy of the instructions, a pencil, an electronic calculator, and a "claim check" that subjects used to claim their earnings.3
In session 5, in addition to the three new budgets listed in Table I , the subjects made five additional decisions. We call this part 2. Here subjects were assigned allocations of tokens, but were asked to decide how many cents each token would be worth, from 0 to 10 cents each. For example, subjects filled out questions like this: Divide 140 tokens: Hold 10 at 1 point each, and Pass 130 at 1 point each. How many cents should each point be worth? (circle one) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 3 The instructions were read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects then filled out the experimental questionnaires, and returned them to the blank envelopes. The envelopes were collected, shuffled, and taken to a neighboring room. Payments for each subject were calculated and put into an envelope labeled with the subject's number. The payment envelopes were then brought back to the room with the waiting subjects. An assistant who had remained in the room with the subjects, and hence had no knowledge of what may be in the payoff envelopes, asked subjects to present their claim checks, one at a time, and gave them their payment envelopes. Since we calculated payoffs in a room away from the subjects, we also used a monitor, selected randomly from among the subjects, to verify to other subjects that the promised procedures for calculating payoffs were followed. Sessions 1-4 lasted less than one hour and subjects earned an average of $9.60. Session 5 lasted about 70 minutes, and subjects earned an average of $19.74. The five choices, presented in random order across subjects, had assignments of hold and pass quantities of (10, 130), (20, 110), (50, 50), (110, 20), and (130, 10), and all tokens were worth 1 point each in every decision. One of the five decisions was chosen at random to be carried out.
Notice that these choices are equivalent to giving subjects budget constraints that slope up. This will allow us to test the conjecture that preferences are perhaps nonmonotonic, and to see if there is some "rational jealousy." For instance, in the example given above, if the subject values points at 10 cents each, then she will earn $1 and her opponent will earn $13. If this inequality is displeasing to the subject, she may value points at, say, 6 cents each, in which case she will earn $0.60 and her opponent will earn $7.80. At the extreme she could value points at 0, in which case both subjects earn nothing.
The full menu of budgets offered is shown in Figure 1 . Those presented in just session 5 are in grey.4
CHECKING RATIONALITY
We begin by looking at the downward sloping budgets. The average choices across the 11 budgets are shown in Table I , where all subjects saw budgets 1-8, and only session 5 saw the additional budgets 9-11. 4 A copy of the instructions used in the experiment is available from the authors, or at www.ssc.
wisc.edu/-andreoni/. Second, did the subjects choose rationally, and if they had violations of the revealed preference axioms, how severe were they? One measure of the severity is Afriat's (1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI). Roughly speaking, the CCEI gives the amount we would have to relax each budget constraint in order to avoid violations.5 The closer the CCEI is to one, the smaller we would have to shrink any budgets to avoid violations. Note that it is possible for the CCEI to be equal to 1 when moving one choice by an infinitesimal amount would remove the violation.6 Since there is no natural significance threshold for the CCEI, we follow Varian's (1991) suggestion of a threshold of 0.95. The violations of revealed preference are listed in Table II . Of the 176 subjects, 18 of them violated one or more of the revealed preference axioms. Of these, 4 had violations CCEI indices of less than 1, and three of those were below the 0.95 threshold.
The choices of subject 40, the subject with the most severe violations, are shown in Figure 2 (a). It is easy to spot violations of all three notions of revealed preference here. Consider three allocations, labelled A, B, and C on the shaded budget constraints. Allocation A is revealed preferred to C, and C to A, violating WARP C is indirectly revealed preferred to B, but B is strictly directly revealed preferred to C, violating SARP and GARP Small shifts along these budgets would not diminish these violations. Hence, there is no well-behaved preference ordering that could have generated the choices of subject 40. AND J. MILLER With the exception of 3 subjects (1.7 percent), we see that behavior can indeed be rationalized by a quasiconcave utility function.7 This raises the third question-how stringent is our revealed preference test? The test will be stronger the more opportunities it gives subjects to make choices that violate the axioms. Bronars (1987) designed a test that looks at this question from an ex ante perspective. The test can be described as finding the probability that a person whose behavior on any budget was purely random would violate GARP. In particular, artificially generate choices by randomly drawing points on each budget line using a uniform distribution across the entire line. Then ask, what is the probability that such an exercise will lead to a violation of revealed preference?
Bronars' test has been applied several times to experimental data. Cox (1997) considered three consumption goods and seven budgets. His study has a Bronars power of 0.49 (49% of random subjects had violations), and supported rational choice. Sippel (1997) conducted two experiments with 8 goods, ranging from Coca-Cola to video games, and 10 budgets. He used Bronars powers of 0.61 and 0.97, but found 95% of subjects violated GARP. Mattei (2000) , in a study similar to Sippel's, considered 8 goods and 20 budgets, with Bronars power of 0.99. He found violations in 30-50% of subjects. Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001), in a study of children, considered 2 goods-chips and juice boxes-and 11 budgets and found that the random subjects violated GARP an expected 8.9 times. Harbaugh, et al., found that students from sixth grade and above were largely consistent with GARP.
We first conducted Bronars' test on the eight budgets of sessions 1-4. Generating a random population of 50,000 subjects, we found 78.1 percent of the random subjects violated all three axioms, with an average of 2.52 violations of WARP, 7.68 of SARP, and 7.52 of GARP. We repeated the analysis using the 11 budgets of session 5 and found that the power increased to 94.7 percent of the random population violating the axioms. There was an average of 4.39 violations of WARP, 17.62 of SARP, and 17.28 of GARP.
Another way to look at the power of the revealed preference test is from an ex post perspective. For instance, if all subjects chose only corner solutions, then the selected budgets would not yield much information about the rationality of choices, regardless of Bronars' power test. Hence, we designed a power test by bootstrapping from the sample of subjects. In particular, we created a population of 50,000 synthetic subjects in which the choices on each budget were randomly drawn from the set of those actually made by our subjects. With this test, for session 1-4 we found 76.4 percent of the synthetic subjects had violations, averaging 2.3 of WARP, 7.43 of SARP, and 6.5 of GARP For session 5, we found 85.7 percent of the subjects had violations, averaging 3.14 of WARP, 10.60 of SARP, and 9.61 of GARP
INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES
Given that subjects' behavior is rationalizable, we can now try to determine the form of utility functions. Looking at the individual data, we found that a large fraction of the subjects could be fit with a well-known utility function. First, 40 subjects, about 22.7 percent, behaved perfectly selfishly, hence U(7, ) 7= 7, could rationalize these data. Second, 25 subjects or 14.2 percent, provided both participants with exactly equal payoffs, implying Leontief preferences of U((7r, 7) = minQ7wS, 7rr}. Finally, 11 subjects, 6.2 percent, allocated their tokens to the person with the highest redemption value (the lowest price), suggesting U(7, 7J = 7r, + 7r, that is, preferences of perfect substitutes.8 These three groupings account for 43 percent of the subjects. This led us to find a means for clustering the remaining subjects by similarities in their choices. We tried several options, but all led to similar classifications of subjects.9 Table III lists the simplest of these classifications, which clusters subjects into groups that minimize the distance to choices from one of the three utility functions just described. Hence, we refer to the three inexact classifications as weaker forms of the first three. For illustration, Figures 2b, 2c and 2d show examples of subjects who fit the weak categories.
The finding of six main types of preferences is striking for two reasons. First, these categories show consistency within each subject-43 percent of subjects fit a standard utility function exactly. Second, and perhaps more importantly, there is a great deal of heterogeneity across subjects. People differ on whether they care about fairness at all, and when they do care about fairness the notion of fairness they employ differs widely, ranging from Rawlsian (Leontief) to Utilitarian (perfect substitutes). Clearly this heterogeneity of preferences is important and will have to be captured by any theory of fairness and altruism.
ESTIMATING PREFERENCES
This section puts more structure on the preferences of the 57 percent of subjects in the weak categories of the prior section. If we were to characterize the preferences of these subjects, what functions would best capture their behavior?
In estimating utility functions, we must first determine the number of unique utility functions to estimate. Since we have eight to eleven observations on each subject we could, in principle, estimate unique utility functions for each individual. For sake of parsimony, however, we opt instead to pool subjects into groups based on the criteria used to generate Table 11 .10 To the extent that this is inaccurate it will dilute the precision of our prediction.
8 Among these, there is variance in their choices in the case where the self and other prices were equal. Three of the eleven subjects divided tokens evenly, while six kept all the tokens. One divided evenly when the pie was six dollars, but kept the whole pie when it was ten dollars. A final subject gave all the pie to the other subject on both allocation decisions.
9 We also used Bayesian algorithms, adaptive search routines, and minimization of within-group variance.
10 We are assuming that subjects in the three "strong" categories made choices that were measured without error, hence their utility functions are known. This is clearly a simplifying assumption, since, for instance, a person we call perfectly selfish may show elasticity to demands if we examined a wider Next we must address the question of what functional form to estimate. We considered three different approaches: Cobb-Douglas, Linear-Expenditures Model, and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). Of these, the CES is the most appealing. First, it provides the best fit, across a number of measures, for all three weak types. Second, all the preferences of all six types of subjects can be described with different parameters of the same utility function; hence differences are easily interpreted with an economic rationale. For brevity, therefore, we report the results only for the CES utility function. Since subjects' choices are censored at both ends of the budget constraint, we estimated the parameters r and A for each weak type using two-limit tobit maximum likelihood, with the restriction that 0 < 7rs/m' < 1. We also found that the error term was heteroskedastic when demands were specified in levels. Hence, to assure homoskedasticity, demands were estimated as budget shares with an i.i.d. error term.
The results of the estimation are shown in Table IV where the decisions of each subject are pooled for each category of subject. The estimated parameters r and A are all signifirange of prices. This may weaken the predictive power of our approach, especially when considering prices outside the range employed in the experiment.
11 The results of the more complete analysis are available from the authors. cant beyond the 0.001 level for all three categories. We also report s.e.-self, the estimated standard error for the residual in the estimation equation for payoff to self. This parameter is important for predicting the distribution of choices from these utility functions. Using the estimates of A and r to solve for a, p, and u-, Table IV shows some interesting differences across types. First, the share parameter a differs substantially, with weakly selfish having the highest and most selfish value. We also see that the elasticity of substitution for the weak Leontief utility function is o-=-0.74, showing a strong complementarity between 7, and 70. The elasticities of substitution for the weak selfish is ou =-2.63 and for weak perfect substitutes is o-=-3.02, indicating both have very flat indifference curves, but those for the weakly perfect substitutes are slightly flatter.
PREDICTION
In this section we explore whether our findings are consistent with behavior in other experiments with similar incentives. Look first at dictator games. Figure 3 illustrates our prediction for a dictator game in which people allocate a pie of 100 with a variable price, that is 7, + pIo = 100. We do this by using the three estimated utility functions and the three exact utility functions to predict choices of subjects.12 We then apply a weight to each of the six predicted values based on their frequency reported in Table III . This gives us an overall prediction for average choice at a given price. Along with the prediction, we also plot our data and five results from four other studies.13 Note that there is a high level 12 A technical appendix is available from the authors, or at www.ssc.wisc.edu/landreoni/. 13 (1999a, b) . Two prominent studies not included are Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996), and Eckel and Grossman (1996). These both employ a "double blind" procedure that has seemed to alter the environment significantly from those our study is meant to capture. These two found average giving of 9.2 percent and 15 percent, respectively, in the double-blind environment. of overall accuracy of our estimating strategy at fitting our data, and consistency with the observations from other experiments.
Are there other experimental games with more price variability that we can use to evaluate and apply our predictions? One related, but imperfect, setting is the linear public goods game. In this game, a person is given a budget of tokens that can be spent on either the private good or the public good. Tokens spent on the private good earn one cent each, while tokens spent on the public good earn a cents (0 < a < 1) for all subjects. Thus, a person can transfer payoff to other subjects at a rate of (1 -a)/a. That is, linear public goods games are multi-person dictator games with a price p = (1 -a)/a.
The linear public goods game is an imperfect application for several reasons. First, it is often repeated, hence allowing learning. This suggests looking at the first round, since there is no experience. However, since forward-looking subjects may play strategically, we may instead want to look at only the final round. Second, public goods games typically have from four to 100 subjects, whereas our estimates were based on two-person games. We can partially address this problem by considering only small groups of four or five subjects. Given these differences, therefore, any comparison with our data and public goods games will be only suggestive.
The estimated giving curve in public goods games is shown in Figure 4 , where we assume subjects care about the per-capita transfer. We also show the results from several public goods experiments, including the first round, last round, and the average across rounds.14 While there is a wide degree of variance in the outside results, the demand curve generated from our data is quite suggestive of an underlying behavioral regularity 14 These are Isaac and Walker (1988), Andreoni (1988 Andreoni ( , 1995a Andreoni ( , 1995b for the first round and the average. For the final round, where learning and experience have taken place but in which no strategic play is possible, the data appear to be shifted down in a somewhat parallel fashion.
A third place to apply these results is to prisoner's dilemma games. Andreoni and Miller (1993) published a study in which subjects participated in 200 rounds of prisoner's dilemma, with randomly assigned partners. Cooperation in this game averaged 20 percent. Given the payoff parameters and the likelihood of meeting a cooperator, we find that the strong perfect substitutes subjects strictly prefer cooperation and the weak perfect substitutes subjects are indifferent between cooperation and defection, with all other subjects strictly preferring defection. Hence, our estimated preferences would predict between 6.25 and 22.4 percent cooperation, which roughly characterizes the findings.
These three examples do not, of course, prove that our results can explain all the findings of other studies, since most other studies differ in important ways from our own. However, the general ability of our results to characterize the findings elsewhere can, we believe, be taken as evidence that, overall, economic experiments are identifying a general degree of predictable and rational behavior, even when subjects are not moneymaximizers.
JEALOUS PREFERENCES
Are preferences monotonic? There are several examples of violations of monotonicity in the experimental literature. Perhaps best known of these is the evidence of "disadvantageous counter-proposals" shown by Ochs and Roth (1989) . In a multiple-round ultimatum bargain game, these authors observed subjects rejecting an offer in one round only to propose a division in the next round that provided less to both subjects than had the original offer been accepted. Another example is provided by Palfrey and Prisbrey (1996, 1997) who presented some subjects in a public goods game with a dominant strategy to contribute, which was not always taken. Is this behavior due to jealousy or spite, which implies nonmonotonic preferences, or is it a more complicated response to strategic concerns? Table V shows the result of part 2 of session 5 which presented subjects with five upward sloping budgets. Subjects were constrained to the allocation of tokens listed in Jealous preferences would mean that, as we move from left to right in the table, that is, more to less advantageous, the average valuation of tokens should get smaller. Indeed it does this, going from 9.94 cents to 8.97 cents. Overall, however, 88 percent of all choices are at the maximum. The nonmonotonicity is due to 8 subjects (23 percent). Given that subjects do shrink token values, the amount of shrinkage is somewhat severe, averaging 6.4 cents on U4 and 5 cents on U5. As expected, most of the nonmonotonic choices-71 percent-occur on the two disadvantageous budgets. Perhaps surprisingly, only one of the 34 subjects ever shrank the token value all the way to zero.
Looking at Ul and U2, we see distaste for inequality does not extend to advantageous inequality. Ul and U2 were shrunk at a quarter of the rate U4 and U5 were shrunk, and four of the five times these two budgets were shrunk the valuation was 8 or 9.
If preferences are nonmonotonic, but still convex, we can apply modified notions of revealed preference to the choices. Doing so, we find that four of the subjects making nonmonotonic choices do so in a way that is consistent with convexity, and four do not. Figure 5 gives an example of each type, where choices on upward sloping budgets are marked with circles. Subject 218 shows preferences that are convex and that dislike both extremes of inequality. The nonmonotonicity of subject 219 cannot be rationalized since the choice of A on the upward sloping budget cannot be reconciled with the choice B on the downward sloping budget.
CONCLUSION
Are altruistic choices consistent with the axioms of revealed preference such that a quasi-concave utility function could have generated the behavior? We find that it is indeed possible to capture altruistic choices with quasi-concave utility functions for individualsaltruism is rational. This is important for theories of fairness and altruism in experiments that are looking for a preference-based approach to explain the data.
What light can our findings shed on efforts to suggest utility functions for fairness and altruism? One essential observation from our study is that individuals are heterogeneous. There is clearly not one notion of fairness or inequality-aversion that all people followpreferences range from Utilitarian to Rawlsian to perfectly selfish. Accounting for this difference will be a necessary part of understanding choices. A second critical observation is that fairness must be addressed and analyzed on an individual level. Because of the individual heterogeneity, a model that predicts well in the aggregate may not help us understand the behavior of individual actors. Capturing the variety of choices among individuals and then aggregating their behavior will lead to better understanding of both individuals and markets when altruism matters. Third, we found that a significant minority of subjects behave jealously-while maintaining convexity of preferences, they violate monotonicity. Fourth, our efforts to apply our results beyond simple dictator games suggests that many things other than the final allocation of money are likely to matter to subjects. Theories may need to include some variables from the game and the context in which the game is played if we are to understand the subtle influences on moral behavior like altruism.
